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SCOTT M. MATHESON, 
Governor, State of 
Utah, ·and DAN S. 
BUSHNELL, Vice Chair-





WESTON E. HAMILTON, 




IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
Case No. 16545 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an original action for issuance of Writ of Mandamus, 
compelling defendant to sign certain bonds to be issued by the Utah 
State Building Ownership Authority. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint for Writ of Man-
damus·and an Order of this Court declaring SB 238, the Utah State Build-
ing Ownership Authority Act; SB 237 authorizing the issuance of 
$25,000,000 in bonds, and SB 321 authorizing the issuance of 2.6 million 
dollars in bonds to be unconstitutional. 
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FACTS 
Defendant accepts the facts as set forth in plaintiffs' 
Brief, with a few additional facts added. 
SB 238, creating the State Building Ownership Authority 
(hereinafter Authority), expressly requires the Authority to lease 
the facilities to be built with the bond issue to only State bodies 
defined as the State of Utah and any department, board, commission 
or agency thereof, except universities or colleges. The Authority 
cannot lease to any other entity whatsoever. SB 238, Section 7. 
The interest and principal of the bonds must be payable solely out 
of the rentals or lease payments received by the Authority from the 
State bodies. SB 238, Section 8. The Authority is mandatorily re-
quired to secure said bond issue by "a pledge and assignment of the 
revenues out of which that obligation shall be made payable." SB 238, 
Section 9 (l)(a). Nothing in any of the acts requires the Authority 
to give the bondholders a mortgage or a priority lien position, but 
the Authority may do so if it deems it advantageous. Section 15 of 
SB 238 provides that all property acquired or held by the Authority is 
declared to be "public property used for essential, public and govern-
mental purposes and shall be exempt from taxation." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPOSED BOND ISSUE AND FINANCING SCHEME CONTEMPLATED 
BY ALL THREE SENATE BILLS ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH 
-2-
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CONSTITUTION. 
Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, generally 
prohibits the Legislature from incurring any debt unless it has pro-
vided for levying a tax annually sufficient to pay the annual interest 
and principal of such debt. Article XIII, Section 9 of the Utah Con-
stitution, likewise provides that no appropriation can be made or any 
expenditure authorized by the Legislature, whereby the expenditure dur-
ing any fiscal year would exceed the total tax then provided for by law. 
Article XIV, Section 1, provides that the Legislature may not incur any 
debt exceeding in the aggregate at any one time an amount equal to 1~ 
percent of the value of the taxable property of the State. There is no 
dispute that the Legislature, when adopting Senate Bills 237, 238, and 
321, did not levy a tax sufficient to pay for the debt contemplated by 
said acts, and that said debt would exceed the available revenue in the 
current year. 
It is defendant's contention that the financing scheme set 
forth in Senate Bill 238, which authorizes a State Building Ownership 
Authority to: (1) issue bonds; (2) construct a facility which is held 
for essential public and governmental purposes; (3) lease to State agen-
cies and State agencies only; (4) repay the bond proceeds from the lease 
rentals; and (5) generally acquire the building for the government of 
the State of Utah, is unconstitutional. It is an attempt by the Legis-
lature of the State of Utah to do indirectly what it could not do directly, 
-3-
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as such would be a violatipn of the above-cited constitutional provi-
sions. Defendant submits that a close examination of the proposed 
financing scheme will disclose when the substance is viewed rather 
than the form, that, in fact, a debt of the State of Utah has been 
created. Defendant also submits that the proposed lease agreements 
with State agencies are not lease agreements but rather cleverly 
disguised contracts for the purchase of buildings where the Legisla-
ture of the State of Utah is the ultimate guarantor and purchaser of 
said building. Defendant also submits that the Building Authority is 
really an instrumentality of the State and, as such, pledges the credit 
of the State of Utah, notwithstanding the express disclaimers by the 
Legislature in the statute that it is not creating a debt of the State 
of Utah. 
Defendant submits herewith the analysis of six cases from 
other jurisdictions which deals with the same fact situation and statu-
tory financing schemes as found in the present case. In every one of 
the six cases cited, the statutes carried express and mandatory dis-
claimers to the effect that: (1) a State debt was not created; (2) the 
bondholders could not look to the general taxing power of the State to 
repay the leases; and (3) nothing could be construed by a court to find 
that a debt of the State had been created. In all of the cases cited, 
that legislative disclaimer was required to be placed on the face of the 
bonds. In all of the cases cited, for various reasons, the courts found 
-4-
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said financing schem5to be in violation of their respective State 
constitutions which generally prohibited incurring debt in excess 
of percentage taxable property limitations or incurring debt without 
having first submitted the matter to a vote of the people. 
·In the case of State ex rel. Nevada Building Authority v. 
Hancock, 468 P.2d 333 (Nevada 1970), the Supreme Court of Nevada held 
that a statutory financing scheme which would be used to pay rent on 
buildings constructed by an independent Authority solely from legisla-
tive appropriations was unconstitutional. The express legislative dis-
claimer that it was not creating a general obligation of the State of 
Nevada is referred to in the Court's opinion at page 335. The Court 
held that the· creation of a separate body corporate does not alter the 
essence of the financing scheme, and the Building Authority was part of 
government since it is managed by public officials and its income depended 
on governmental appropriations for rent. The Court noted: 
"Section 8 provides, however, that rentals pay-
able from a State agency may be derived from legislative 
appropriations made in each biennium or the legislature may 
pledge itself to make future appropriations for rent, either 
in full or to the extent not defrayed by revenues. These 
provisions are the essence of the financing scheme. The 
permissive word 'may', used with regard to legislative ap-
propriations for rent cannot serve to disguise the basic 
character of the scheme. Without question, the legislature 
will appropriate the needed funds. If it did not do so, the 
contemplated public construction for State agency use could 
not proceed." At page 336. 
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature would make the 
appropriations, notwithstanding the express legislative disclaimer set 
-5-
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set forth in the statute .. The Court stated: 
" .•. Within the context of the public building 
pregram involved, however, it is our view that successive 
biennial appropriations for rent until the bonds issued 
by the Authority are fully retired must be considered 
in the same light as a legislative pledge to make future 
appropriations for the purpose. It is inconceivable that 
the legislature would default in either instance since the 
good faith of Nevada would not allow it .•.. " At page 
338. 
The Nevada Supreme Court also examined the "special fund" exception. 
This exception generally provides that revenue bonds may be issued not 
subject to State constitutional debt limitations if they are to be re-
paid from proceeds from the use of the facility constructed. This de-
fendant submits that the special fund doctrine is not applicable when 
the revenues from the use of the facility do not come from nongovern-
menta 1 sources, usually from private or commercia 1 use of the facilities. 
This distinguishes the present case from the cases of Spence v. Utah Stat! 
Agriculture College, 225 P.2d 18 (Utah 1950), and Tribe v. Salt Lake Ci~ 
540 P.2d 499 (1975), cited by plaintiffs' in their Brief as each of those 
cases contemplated the receipt of revenue from the general public which 
would offset the cost of operating and constructing the facility andre· 
pay the bond proceeds. The Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
" ... To the extent that such revenues are de-
rived from a nongovernmental source, or from rentals 
paid by a State agency which in turn derives rent pay-
ing income from user fees, a State public debt within 
the meaning of the Constitution is not created .... 
In such a case the nongovernmental user is the debtor 
rather than the State." At page 337. (Citations omitted.) 
-6-
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In the case of State of Washington v. Yelle, 289 P;2d 355 
(Washington 1955), the Washington Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
a statute setting up a State Building Financing Authority, as such 
would in effect create an installment purchase by the State of cer-
tain buildings with State money raised by taxation in excess of the 
constitutional debt limitation. The Court held the scheme unconstitu-
tional.· The express legislative disclaimer found in the statute author-
izing the bond issue and reciting that it did not create a general obli-
gation of the State is referred to in the opinion at page 356. The 
Washington Supreme Court concluded that the proposed lease arrangement 
was, in substance, really a purchase agreement by the State through a 
State instrumentality of certain buildings to get around the debt limita-
tions in the Constitution. The Court concluded that the Building Author-
ity did not deal at arms' length with the various State agencies; that it 
was statutorily required to lease to only State agencies, and the rela-
tionship was not that of an ordinary landlord and tenant. The Court ex-
amined the "special fund" doctrine and concluded that it was inevitable 
that to pay off the rentals, "a resort to the general taxation was neces-
sary." The Court stated: 
"We recognize the housing problem with which 
the State is confronted. Nevertheless, we cannot 
permit the exigency of the situation to override the 
constitutional safeguard against improvidence and the 
integrity of the State's economy. We cannot resort to 
dexterity of judicial thinking in order to assist the 
-7-
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State in its problem. We cannot close our eyes to 
what is actually being attempted. When we strip the 
plan down to fundamentals, we find that it is not a 
leasing arrangement between landlord and tenant, 
but the installment purchase by the State of certain build-
ings and facilities with State moneys raised by taxation 
far in excess of the constitutional limitation." At 
pages 361, 362. 
Defendant submits that the proposed bond issue in the present case is 
also, in substance, a purchase agreement by the State of Utah of cer-
tain buildings which are declared to be for "public and governmental 
purposes" and exempt from taxation. At the conclusion of the repayment 
of the bonds, the buildings will revert to the State of Utah for public 
use. Therefore, the Legislature has done indirectly what it could not 
do directly--that is, create a debt in excess of available funds in the 
current year to purchase a building. They have also bound future Legis-
latures to appropriate the funds because the holders of the bonds must 
look to the Legislature for payment of the lease and rentals and cannot 
look to anyone else. The Utah statute does not even require granting 
the bondholders a mortgage or lien interest in the building, although 
under the facts in the present case, the Authority has do so by resolu-
tion. 
The above-cited Yelle case drew heavily on McCutcheon v. State 
Building Authority, 13 N.J. 46, 97 A.2d 663 (1953), wherein the Supreme 
Court of the State of New Jersey held a statute creating a Building Owner· 
ship Authority violated constitutional provisions prescribing debt limita· 
tion when required to lease solely to State agencies and to repay bond 
-8-
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proceeds from lease rentals. The express legislative disclaimer 
that it was not creating a debt or obligation of the State, or 
pledging its faith and credit, is referred to in the opinion at 
97 A.2d 663, 666. The Court stated: 
" ... While in form a way of providing the State 
with leasehold interests in building facilities for 
public use, in reality the design of the act is to en-
able the State by contracts of purchase to acquire for 
State use buildings possessed and constructed by the 
Authority by means of bond issues sustained by the State's 
promise to supply in the guise of rentals sufficient money 
to liquidate the bonds, available only through the medium 
of annual appropriations. And this in disregard of the 
constitutional debt limitation and the restraints laid by 
the organic law upon the appropriation process .••• The 
legislation proceeds upon the hYpothesis that the fulfill-
ment of the project will not burden the State with a debt 
or liability within the constitutional sense. But in this 
the·accent is on the external appearance rather than the 
substance. The label is unimportant; it is not the form 
but the essence that controls. It is an obvious truism that 
constitutional limitations may not be set at naught by in-
direction." At page 668. 
The Court also noted in very strong language at page 666 that the proposed 
lease agreement was, in substance and effect, a purchase agreement of 
the property, and the Authority could not function were it not for the 
appropriation from the Legislature. This parallels the Utah statute ex-
actly. The Court noted: 
" ... The Authority may 'lease' only to State depart-
ments, agencies, and instrumentalities and at a 'rental' 
determined by this standard. These are not leases as in the 
case of the Prentice Company, but contracts of purchase by 
the sovereign for public use; the 'rentals' constitute appro-
priations made by the State, not alone to provide operating ex-
penses, but in quantum sufficient for the ultimate payment 
-9-
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and retirement or the bonds. A true lease rental is 
compensation for the use of the property, not the 
co~sideration price for its purchase." At page 669. 
The significance of the New Jersey Supreme Court decision is not so 
much in its conclusion that the leasing device is really an install-
ment purchase by the State or a lease agreement by the State with 
itself (at page 671), but in the following express language: 
"The constitutional debt-limitation prov1s1on is 
not limited in quality and scope to debts enforceable 
by action. It has in view the temptation or inducement 
and incentive to make appropriations for 'debts' beyond 
the prescribed amount, unless approved by the people in 
the manner ordained. Moral and ethical compulsions are 
not to be allowed to override the constitutional safeguard 
against improvidence and the integrity of the State's 
economy." At page 671. 
The Court also concluded by noting that one Legislature cannot bind a 
succeeding Legislature with the duty of making appropriations, as well 
as sevenelycritizing the Building Authority for attempting to discover 
a legal way to illegally evade the constitutional requirements. At page 
673. 
Defendant submits that under the above-cited case, wherein the 
New Jersey Supreme Court found that it was not necessary to have a "legaH 
enforceable debt" in order to violate the spirit of their constitutional 
provisions on debt limitations, that the Utah Legislature has, in fact, 
lent the full faith of the State of Utah upon which the bondholders will 
surely rely to guaranty that sufficient funds will be appropriated in 
each session of the Legislature until the proposed 25 million dollars in 
-10-
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bonds are fully retired. In this regard, a debt has been created 
in violation of the spirit of the constitutional prohibitions on 
debt limitations. 
In the case of State Office Bldg. Commission v. Trujillo, 
46 N.M. 29, 120 P.2d 434 (1942}, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held 
unconstitutional a Building Ownership Commission which would incur a 
debt to. be repaid entirely from agencies utilizing the facilities. 
The express legislative disclaimer that a general obligation debt of 
the State of New Mexico was not created is referred to in the opinion 
at page 438. The New Mexico Supreme Court discussed in depth the de-
velopment of the "special fund" doctrine within the State of New Mexico 
and concluded that it had no application because the "special fund" 
doctrine expressly requires that the monies be derived from sources 
other than general taxation, such as private and commercial users of 
the facility. The Court also, in reviewing the application of the 
"special fund" doctrine, noted the following regarding constitutional 
"debt": 
'"Speaking of the term 'debt' as used in article 
9, Section 12, of the State Constitution, in Seward Y. 
Bowers (37 N.M. 385, 24 P.2d 253}, we said: 'The idea 
of a 'debt' in the constitutional sense is that an obli-
gation has arisen out of contract, express or implied, which 
entitles the creditor unconditionally to receive from the 
debtor· a sum of money, which the debtor is under a legal, 
equitable, or moral duty to pay without regard to any 
future contingency.'" At page 442. 
-11-
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The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that it was inevitable that to 
pay off the rentals, a resort to general taxation is necessary, and, 
therefore, the special fund doctrine could not obtain. The Court 
stated: 
"' And, in the case of enterprises authorized 
by the Legislature to be embarked upon through State 
agencies, a particular scheme of financing will be 
held to be valid only where it is clearly demonstrable 
from the specific terms of the financing proposal it-
self that no tax burden or pecuniary liability of the 
State to appropriate or pay for the indebtedness about 
to be incurred will ever arise, or be looked to as 
security, in whole or in part, for repayment of the bor-
rowed moneys.' 11 At page 445. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court also dealt specifically with the 
express legislative disclaimer that it was not creating a debt of the 
State of New Mexico by stating: 
11 
••• Such expression /disclaimer of indebted-
ness of the State of New Mexico/ can be of no force 
because the basic purpose, substance and plan of the 
Act, and the detailed provisions looking to the 
accomplishment of such purpose, show differently. Such 
matters are for judicial and not legislative determina-
tion. 11 At page 449. (Bracketed portion added.) 
In the case of State of \~est Virginia ex rel. Hall v. Taylor, 
178 S.E. 2d 48 (1970), the West Virginia Supreme Court held unconstitu· 
tional a statute authorizing a Building Commission to issue bonds to be 
repaid by renting buildings to State agencies, despite a legislative 
declaration that a State debt was not created. The express legislative 
disclaimer that it was not creating a general debt of the State of West 
-12-
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Virginia or pledging the credit or taxing power of the State for 
payment of the rentals, is referred to in the opinion at page 52. 
The Court, in holding that the proposed financing scheme was un-
constitutional, stated that the "separate fund doctrine" could not 
be applied to a fund which is created and maintained, in whole or 
in part, by general tax revenues. They also concluded that the 
Court must consider the substance of a plan rather the form, and 
said that the financing scheme was an unconstitutional attempt to 
bind subsequent Legislatures to make appropriations of monies. 
In the case of In re Matter of the Constitutionality of 
Chapter 280, Oregon Laws 1975, Martin v. Oregon Building Authority, et 
~ .• 276 Or. 135, 554 P.2d 126 (1976), the Supreme Court of Oregon 
held unconstitutional a Building Authority Act which would borrow 
funds through a bond issue to errect a building to be leased solely 
to State agencies, the proceeds to be repaid by lease rentals from 
said State agencies. Reference to the express legislative disclaimer 
that a general debt or obligation of the State was not being created 
is found at page 127 of the opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court provided 
a historical development of the constitutional provisions regarding 
debt limitation. 
Generally, debt limitations were in response to heavy borrow-
ing engaged in by many States prior to 1840. Bond proceeds were utilized 
to finance internal improvements, such as canals, railroads, turnpikes, 
enlargement of banking facilities, and to open up markets and stimulate 
-13- . 
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commerce. Following the depression of 1837, many States defaulted 
on their obligations during the 1840's. These embarrassments led to 
taxpayer adoptions of constitutional provisions designed to curb 
the Legislature's ability to subject tax funds to long-term obliga-
tions and debt servicing. States entering the Union in later years 
adopted provisions containing debt limitations. About thirty years 
later, States began requiring, by constitutional provisions, that 
local governmental entities could not incur debts above certain limita-
tions. The predominant purpose of constitutional debt limitations was 
the achievement of a high degree of control over debt creation in order 
to forestall irresponsibly imposed tax burdens. Likewise, they were 
to be a protection to the people of the whole against burdensome and 
excessive taxation to pay for debt obligations incurred in earlier years. 
They were also intended to prevent exposing the sources of public revenue 
to potential hazard and otherwise impairing the flexibility of planning 
and the ability of future Legislatures to avoid a ta1< increase. Said 
debt restrictions were designed to force representatives of the people 
to operate the government within its means and remove the temptation to 
undertake projects on an "enjoy now, pay later" basis. This defendant 
submits that, if the present financing scheme is approved by this Court 
as contemplated by the Utah Legislature, then the floodgates are thrown 
open and the Legislature would no longer have to comply with constitutional 
requirements that a sufficient tax be levied to pay any debt that is in-
curred in the current year. This manifestly violates the spirit of Article 
-14-
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XIII, Sections 2 and 9, placing limitations upon the Legislature 
incurring debt. It would of necessity render portions of Sections 
2 and 9 of Article XIII null and void. 
The proposed financing scheme by the Utah Legislature in 
the current case is one of several devices designed to skirt debt 
limitations. It basically divorces the borrowing function from the 
paying function in what is essentially one integrated transaction. 
That is, the borrowing power is located in the State Building Owner-
ship Authority, and the paying function is vested in the Utah Legis-
lature through appropriations for leases and rentals as the Oregon 
Supreme Court noted: 
" ... Use of the authority permits the discre-
tionary incurrence of long-term obligations, which 
the state is in substance obligated to repay from 
general tax revenues, without limit and without control 
by the voters." At page 132. 
This defendant submits that the current financing scheme to be 
repaid solely from rentals generated by State agencies occupying the 
facilities is, in fact, the creation of a obligation of the State of Utah 
to which the State's full faith is pledged in violation of the Utah Consti-
tution. The proposed lease agreements are, in fact, purchase agreements 
whereby the State would acquire a building for essential public and govern-
mental purposes. The Building Ownership Authority is an instrument of 
the State of Utah, and, as such, has entered into a contract with the State. 
This Court should look to the substance of the proposed financing scheme 
rather than the form and conclude that the Utah constitutional provisions 
- l 5-
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on debt limitations set fo~th in Ar icle XIII, Section 2 and 
Section 9, and Article XIV, Section , have in substance been violated 
-16-
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